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Abstract 
Since taking office the Administration of George W. Bush has pursued a trade policy known 
as Competitive Liberalization. This policy envisages a series of mutually-reinforcing steps to 
open markets abroad to U.S. companies, to strengthen market-oriented laws and regulations 
overseas, and to place the U.S. at the centre of the world trading system. Foreign and security 
policy considerations have influenced U.S. trade policymaking, perhaps more so than in the 
1990s. To date the principal outcome of this policy has been the negotiation by the U.S. of 
numerous free trade agreements, mainly with developing countries individually or in sub-
regional groupings. In addition to characterising this policy in detail, the principal purpose of 
this paper is to assess the logic underlying this approach to trade policymaking and whether 
Competitive Liberalization has begun to fulfil the promise spelt out for it at the beginning of 
this decade. 
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1. Introduction. 
Since taking office in 2001 the Administration of President George W. Bush has pursued a 
trade policy of Competitive Liberalization. This policy was espoused by Mr. Robert Zoellick, 
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) during the first term of the Bush 
Administration. Three objectives of this policy can be clearly identified. First, to induce a 
competition for access to the large U.S. market, thereby encouraging foreign countries to open 
their economies to U.S. companies and farmers. Second, to encourage the adoption abroad of 
U.S.-style market-friendly business laws and regulations, or at least the adoption of 
regulations that U.S. businesses can accommodate more easily. These two objectives are to be 
accomplished through mutually-reinforcing bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade 
initiatives. The third objective is to encourage other nations to support U.S. foreign policy and 
military objectives and, more broadly, what might be termed U.S. values. The purpose of this 
paper is to offer an interim assessment of the U.S. trade policy of Competitive Liberalization, 
bearing in mind that the second term of the Bush Administration has not ended and that any 
dynamics created by this policy may well influence trade and other outcomes in future U.S. 
administrations. 
An assessment of the Competitive Liberalization is of interest for the following five reasons. 
First, the implementation of this policy has resulted in the most sustained effort by the United 
States to sign free trade agreements (FTAs) since World War II. For some this represents a 
departure from the United States' central focus on multilateralism (Feinberg 2003).
1 
Identifying the factors that account for the shift in U.S. policy towards FTAs would therefore 
add to our understanding of the evolution of U.S. trade policy over time. Second, the policy of 
Competitive Liberalization puts considerable weight on the inter-relationships between 
different so-called levels of trade negotiation and reform (namely, the bilateral, regional, and 
multilateral levels), which some have argued were very important for preserving the 
momentum towards lower trade barriers in the past (see, for example, Bergsten 1996). 
Experience since 2001 might shed light on the continuing relevance of the latter argument. 
Third, Competitive Liberalization is a form of sequential trade liberalisation, the economics of 
which is relatively little understood.
2 (Indeed the purpose of this Special Issue is to better 
understand the factors which account for the launching of trade initiatives over time and the 
consequences that follow from these initiatives.) It will be interesting to examine the 
similarity and differences between Competitive Liberalization and existing explanations for 
sequential trade reform, such as Domino Regionalism (Baldwin 1993).
3 Fourth, to the best of 
our knowledge most of the assessments of Competitive Liberalization have been made by 
U.S.-based authors, in particular by those resident in Washington, D.C.-based think tanks 
(Barfield 2005, Feinberg 2003, Schott 2001, 2004a, 2005, and 2006). We detect a tempering 
of support for Competitive Liberalization among these latter analysts in the last year or so, 
and this prompted us to probe deeper into the success or otherwise of this policy and the 
factors that might be responsible. Fifth some, including Ambassador Zoellick, saw the policy 
of Competitive Liberalization as a means to reassert and strengthen U.S. influence over the 
future direction of the world trading system. Again, it might be useful to think through the 
channels of U.S. influence and the extent to which the implementation of Competitive 
Liberalization has fulfilled its promise in this regard. 
                                                           
1 For others, however, the United States has always been interested in signing bilateral trade agreements with 
certain partners, such as Canada and Mexico, and leapt at the chance to do so once fears about the impact of U.S. 
exports into those partners were overcome. See Baldwin (1997) for such an argument. An informative account of 
changing U.S. policy towards FTAs can be found in Destler (2006). 
2 This is not to say that political scientists and international relations scholars have not considered this matter.  
3 For a recent survey of theories of sequential regional integration see Evenett (2004).   4
To reduce the likelihood of misunderstandings a number of preliminary comments are in 
order. The first is that when we refer to free trade agreements, be they bilateral or regional in 
membership, we are referring to agreements between countries that typically involve not only 
the liberalisation of trade in non-agricultural products but also reforms of other types of 
international commerce (including international investments) and of the business laws and 
regulations. Therefore, for our present purposes, FTAs can include many so-called behind-
the-border measures, of which rules on the protection of intellectual property rights is an 
important example. The second preliminary comment is that we do not claim that trade 
agreements that include provisions on behind-the-border measures are new.
4 Nor do we wish 
to imply that foreign and security policy considerations have never influenced the design and 
implementation of U.S. trade policy before.
5  Indeed, more generally, we do not mean to 
suggest that elements of the current policy of Competitive Liberalization do not find any 
counterparts in U.S. trade policy before the Administration of George W. Bush took office in 
2001. Moreover, nothing in what follows should be read to mean that Competitive 
Liberalization has been implemented uniformly across regions and over time.  
The third preliminary comment refers to the term Competitive Liberalization itself. This term 
predates the current U.S. administration and, potentially confusingly, has also been taken to 
describe both a trade policy strategy and a set of dynamics and pressures facing states during 
the current era of globalisation (Bergsten 1996, Steinberg 1998). As a result we will take 
particular care in reporting the definitions and explanations of Competitive Liberalization 
advanced by this policy's supporters. Although our focus here is on assessing the 
implementation of Competitive Liberalization by the Administration of President George W. 
Bush, we will have something to say about the more longer-standing logic that underlies the 
trade policy strategy which goes by the same name.
6 
The final preliminary comment concerns our assessment itself. We do not propose to calculate 
the welfare effects of recent concluded or potential future FTAs, as others have done (see, for 
example, De Rosa and Gilbert 2004). Consequently, we shall not contribute to the debate as to 
whether the current yield from Competitive Liberalization is "small potatoes" (Schott 2006). 
(The term "small" begs the question "compared to what?" and we could find no widely-
accepted benchmark that would help settle this matter.) Nor, do we propose to analyse with 
theoretical tools Competitive Liberalization, even though one of us has tried to do so 
elsewhere (Evenett 2005b). Instead, we will focus on the internal logic of Competitive 
Liberalization, on the incentives that it creates, on the potential tensions created by the three 
different objectives of this policy identified earlier, and on whether this policy is beginning to 
deliver what its advocates claimed it would. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section seeks to accurately 
characterise the policy of Competitive Liberalization and to describe what its proponents 
argue is the logic underlying this policy. This section makes ample use of quotations so as to 
avoid inadvertently misrepresenting the proponents' positions in summary form and because, 
quite frankly, sometimes these quotations are open to multiple interpretations.
7 The  third 
section briefly discusses the implementation of Competitive Liberalization from 2001 through 
the end of 2006. Appraisals of Competitive Liberalization by others are discussed in the 
fourth section. The fifth section contains our assessment of Competitive Liberalization. 
Concluding remarks are found in the sixth and last section of the paper. 
                                                           
4 After all, national treatment provisions have been included in trade agreements for decades. 
5 For different views on the relative importance of foreign and security policy factors in influencing U.S. trade 
policy over recent years, see Higgott (2003) and Philipps (2007). 
6 Moreover, our focus here is on current U.S. trade policy and thus only considers other nations' trade policies in 
so far as they are relevant to understanding the U.S. trade policy of Competitive Liberalization.  
7 In a much earlier account and assessment of Competitive Liberalization Steinberg (1998) made the same point.   5
2.  Characterising Competitive Liberalization. 
So as to understand the U.S. trade policy of Competitive Liberalization it is important to 
appreciate the context in which it was first articulated and the rationale, such as it is, for this 
policy. The material in this section draws primarily upon speeches, newspaper interviews, and 
congressional testimonies given by U.S. policymakers, in particular by the United States 
Trade Representative, and reports by the Bush Administration and by the Congressional 
Research Service (which produces many analyses of U.S. trade policy options).  
Arguably three factors significantly conditioned the context in which Competitive 
Liberalization was initially articulated in the early years of this decade. The first factor was 
that the Clinton Administration was unable to persuade Congress to renew Trade Promotion 
Authority (formerly known as Fast Track Authority) and that the United States' trading 
partners signed numerous bilateral and regional trade agreements during the 1990s and in the 
early years of this decade. For some this implied that the United States was "falling behind". 
Ambassador Zoellick began an editorial in the New York Times, published on 14 April 2002, 
as follows: 
The United States has been falling behind the rest of the world in pursuing trade 
agreements. Worldwide, there are 150 regional free-trade agreements and customs 
agreements; the United States is a party to only three. Each one sets new rules and 
opens markets for those that signed on and creates hurdles for those outside the 
agreement. 
He went on to urge the U.S. Senate to grant the Bush Administration Trade Promotion 
Authority (TPA). Previously, in testimony before the Committee on Finance of the U.S. 
Senate, Ambassador Zoellick argued that nothing less than U.S. leadership of the world 
trading system was at stake: 
In the absence of this authority other countries have been moving forward with 
trade agreements while America has stalled. We cannot afford to stand still--or be 
mired in partisan division--while other nations seize the mantle of leadership on 
trade from the United States. This would be a huge missed opportunity indeed an 
historical mistake. Given the size of the U.S. economy--and the reach, creativity, 
and influence of our private sector--we should be and can be shaping the rules of 
the international economic system for the new century (Zoellick 2001a, page 8). 
We will return to the "partisan division" and Congressional attitudes towards U.S. trade policy 
soon enough, but first it will be useful to clarify precisely which rules Ambassador Zoellick 
had in mind shaping. In a speech to the Kangaroo Group in Strasbourg, France, on 15 May 
2001 he identified the following wide range of government measures that could be influenced 
through trade agreements: 
…we need to align the global trading system with our values. We can encourage 
open and efficient markets while respecting national sovereignty. We can 
encourage respect for core labor standards, environmental protection, and good 
health without slipping into fear-based campaigns and protectionism. And we 
must always seek to strengthen freedom, democracy, and the rule of law (Zoellick 
2001b, page 8). 
As this quotation indicates the range of U.S. objectives for its trade policy goes well beyond 
liberalising border measures, such as tariffs and customs clearance. It is also noteworthy that 
the U.S. "always seek"(s) to attain freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. In sum, 
apparently the Bush Administration wanted TPA not only to catch up with its trading partners, 
but also to reassert its central position as the writer of rules for the world trading system.   6
The second important conditioning factor refers to developments in the U.S. Congress, in 
particular, changes in the committee system and the polarisation of the U.S. Congress on trade 
policy matters. Schott (2001) describes how the growing decentralisation of power in the U.S. 
Congress has weakened committee chairmen and allowed congressmen and women sitting on 
numerous committees to influence U.S. trade policy. Interest groups know this and lobby 
individual legislators to propose trade measures that promote their commercial and other 
interests. 
Destler (2005) carefully charts the decline of bipartisan cooperation on trade matters, which 
was evident for all to see by the 1990s. With closer and closer votes on trade-related 
legislation, especially in the U.S. House of Representatives, small groups of legislators that 
have been particularly keen on certain measures being included or excluded from a trade 
agreement have wielded considerable influence. This accounts in part for the growing number 
of behind-the-border matters that came to be included in the trade negotiating objectives 
Congress set for the executive branch in the 1990s and after. 
The third contextual factor is that the relationship between international trade and national 
security were clearly in the minds of the executive branch from the beginning of the Bush 
Administration in January 2001 (although this is not to say that the emphasis on foreign and 
national security factors did not intensify later on). In his confirmation hearing before the U.S. 
Senate's Committee on Finance Ambassador Zoellick first quoted President Bush as saying 
"Economic freedom creates habits of liberty. And habits of liberty create expectations of 
democracy" (Zoellick 2001a, page 5). Mr. Zoellick went on to link international trade and 
national security explicitly, as follows: 
…expanded trade affects our national security. The crises of the first 45 years of 
the last century…were inextricably linked with hostile protectionism and national 
socialism. Communism could not compete with democratic capitalism, because 
economic and political freedom creates dynamism, competition, opportunity, and 
independent thinking (Zoellick 2001a, page 5).  
In the aftermath of the attacks on New York City and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, the 
connection between trade policy initiatives and national security was arguably strengthened. 
The desire by leading nations to demonstrate that they were united and that they could work 
together was a contributing factor to the launch of the Doha Round in November 2001. Just 
before the associated Ministerial Meeting, in an article in the International Herald Tribune on 
8 November 2001, Ambassador Zoellick argued: 
The international market economy, of which trade and the WTO are vital parts, 
offers an antidote to this violent rejectionism. Trade is about more than economic 
efficiency. It reflects a system of values: openness, peaceful exchange, 
opportunity, inclusiveness and integration, mutual gains through interchange, 
freedom of choice, appreciation of differences, governance through agreed rules, 
and a hope for betterment for all peoples and lands.  
Therefore, just as the Cold War reflected a contest of values, so will this campaign 
against terrorism. Just as America's Cold War strategy recognized the 
interconnection of security and economics, so must its strategy against terrorism.  
By promoting the WTO's agenda, especially a new negotiation to liberalize global 
trade, these 142 nations can counter the revulsive destructionism of terrorism.
8 
                                                           
8 In addition to U.S. support for launching the Doha Round, this trade-security linkage has had other implications 
for U.S. trade policy, as will become clear in the sections that follow. 
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Catching up, congressional politics, and foreign and security policy concerns were to 
influence the U.S. trade policy of Competitive Liberalization, whose components and 
rationale were spelt by U.S. officials on numerous occasions from 2001 onwards. Perhaps the 
most succinct description of U.S. trade policy in the Bush Administration was given by 
Ambassador Zoellick in a letter to the Comptroller of the United States on 3 December 2003 
and is reproduced directly below: 
When the Bush Administration set out to revitalise America's trade agenda almost 
three years ago, we outlined our plans clearly and openly: We would pursue a 
strategy of "competitive liberalization" to advance free trade globally, regionally, 
and bilaterally. By moving forward simultaneously on multiple fronts the United 
States can: overcome or bypass obstacles; exert maximum leverage for openness, 
target the needs of developing countries, especially the most committed to 
economic and political reforms; establish models of success, especially in cutting-
edge areas; strengthen America's ties with all regions within a global economy; 
and create a fresh political dynamic by putting free trade on the offensive (GAO 
2004, page 57). 
Ambassador Zoellick went on to specify the "pathways" the United States has created to 
encourage trade reform by other countries: 
Competitive liberalization offers countries within regions a step-by-step pathway 
to greater trade reforms and openness with the United States. Both the President's 
Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative
9 and his plan to work toward a Middle East Free 
Trade Area
10   start by helping non-member countries to join the WTO, 
strengthening both the global rules-based system and countries participating in it. 
For those more advanced, we negotiate Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreements (TIFAs) and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). We employ these 
customized arrangements to resolve trade and investment issues, improve 
performance in areas such as protecting intellectual property rights and 
strengthening customs operations, promote business ties, analyze the possibilities 
for an FTA, and prepare for the capacity to negotiate an FTA. Finally, we may 
negotiate a wide-ranging, state-of-the-art FTA that will help establish a model for 
a region and incentives for neighbours. With this graduated, stepladder approach, 
we can engage virtually every country interested in working with us, and more 
importantly, we create a healthy dynamic in which countries complete to become 
fuller members of the world trading system and better partners of the United 
States (GAO 2004, page 58). 
This statement is important as it suggests that FTAs are in principle only one part (or stage) of 
the policy of Competitive Liberalization. Moreover, this policy envisages in many cases a 
stage before negotiations over a FTA commence, namely, the negotiation and implementation 
of TIFAs and BITs. TIFAs allow for discussions between the United States and its trading 
partners, providing the former with an opportunity to demand reforms of the latter before 
contemplating launching FTA negotiations.
11  Relatedly, encouraging countries to join the 
                                                           
9 Denoted EAI hereafter. 
10 Denoted MEFTA hereafter. 
11 Further information on the role of the TIFAs was given in testimony before the House International Relations 
Committee's Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific on 25 June 2003 by Mr. Ralph Ives, Assistant USTR for Asia-
Pacific and APEC. Mr Ives noted that: 
Dialogue under the TIFA allows us to resolve key outstanding trade issues and to prepare the 
groundwork for possible FTA negotiations. For example, we may seek improvements in our 
trading partner's protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs), migration of 
customs-related problems, and resolution of specific market access issues. Of course, because   8
WTO may on the face of it seem a noble pro-multilateral gesture. That view is tempered by 
the take-it-or-leave-it nature of most WTO accession negotiations, whereby every existing 
WTO member must agree to the admission of a new member so putting the applicant at a 
serious negotiating disadvantage (see Evenett, Kennett, and Gage (2005) and the country case 
studies contained in Evenett (2005a)). 
In his confirmation hearings Mr. Zoellick was very clear about the message that he wanted to 
send to America's trading partners: 
I want to be able to tell my counterparts that we are willing to negotiate if they are 
serious about eliminating barriers, yet also make clear that America will look 
elsewhere if they delay--the United States will move forward, and it is up to them 
to join us or be left behind (Zoellick 2001a, page 9). 
The notion that the United States' trading partners will be left behind if they do not reform, 
and that being left behind creates pressures to reform, seems to be at the core of the 
intertemporal dynamic created by Competitive Liberalization.
12   Time and again U.S. 
executive branch officials refer to this argument. For example, Mr. Alan Johnson, Chief 
Agricultural Negotiator with the Office of the United States Trade Representative, stated in 
testimony before the U.S. Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations on 20 May 2003 that: 
Our strategy is to incite competitive liberalization by negotiating regional and 
bilateral agreements to complement our global strategy in the WTO. If others are 
ready to open their markets, America will be their partner. If some are not ready, 
or want to complain but not lower their barriers, the United States will proceed 
with countries that are ready. This competition in liberalization strengthens the 
United States' already considerable leverage, including in the WTO. 
The U.S. has sought to strengthen its leverage in one trade negotiating arena by engaging in 
trade negotiations in other arenas. For example, after the negotiations for a Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA) stalled, Ambassador Zoellick stated that the United States would 
accelerate along a second track in Latin America by negotiating free trade agreements with 
several Central American nations and the Dominican Republic. Referring to the United States' 
trade negotiating priorities in Latin America he noted: 
It's the ALCA (FTAA), but it's also the step-by-step process of competitive 
liberalization which we believe helps keep up the momentum (as reported in the 
Miami Herald on 15 November 2003). 
Although many of the FTAs that the Bush Administration was to eventually negotiate were 
with relatively smaller economies, U.S. officials had indicated that signing FTAs with the 
largest economies in the world was within the ambit of Competitive Liberalization. Moreover, 
negotiations in one region are thought to enhance the likelihood of the United States 
successfully negotiating with trading partners in other regions, as this statement by 
Ambassador Zoellick makes clear: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
these discussions are intended to be mutually beneficial, we try to address issues identified by our 
trading partners. 
In general, however, we have found very little information about the operation and consequences of TIFAs. This 
may be an area for further research, especially as the number of TIFAs signed by the United States is increasing. 
One question worth asking is the extent to which TIFAs are a pre-requisite for a FTA with the United States, a 
consolation prize for being rejected for a FTA, or a delaying tactic to stall the start of FTA negotiations with the 
United States. 
12  This intertemporal feature of Competitive Liberalization is also found in Baldwin's Domino Theory of 
Regionalism, which is said to provide accounts of the expansion of both the European Economic Community 
over time and the free trade agreements in North America (see Baldwin 1993).   9
We would like to pursue FTAs with the largest markets around the world, 
including the European Union and Japan among others. But right now, those 
countries are unwilling to move forward. As a result, we are pushing for the 
liberalization of their markets through the WTO. At the same time, as another 
facet of competitive liberalization, we hope our progress on other FTAs will 
encourage those important markets to reconsider their stance (U.S. State 
Department Press Releases and Documents, 28 April 2004).
13 
This statement indicates the cumulative nature of the expected results from Competitive 
Liberalization, perhaps providing one benchmark against which to eventually evaluate the 
efficacy of the policy. 
The Bush Administration also sees its demands for "gold-standard" FTAs (which include 
many behind-the-border measures) as being beneficial to parties to the agreement.
14 In a Wall 
Street Journal op-ed on 10 July 2003, Ambassador Zoellick argued as follows: 
America's FTAs break new ground--they establish prototypes for liberalization in 
areas such as services, e-commerce, intellectual property for knowledge societies, 
transparency in government regulation, and better enforcement of labor and 
                                                           
13 More recently Ms. Susan Schwab, the USTR appointed after Ambassador Portman, reiterated many of the 
same points in an interview with the National Journal on 15 July 2006. In response to the question "Beyond the 
Doha Round, what is your strategic thinking about future trade agreements?" Ambassador Schwab said: "I do not 
preclude bilateral agreements with either big countries or small countries where there is--and here is the key--the 
ambition to do a gold-standard free-trade agreement. There are a lot of countries out there negotiating FTAs, and 
what they are doing is negotiating around their sensitivities. The way we negotiate FTAs, everything is on the 
table. And that includes our sensitivities and their sensitivities" (page 63). Readers may wish to re-read and 
perhaps re-evaluate this remark in the light of the statements reported in footnote 29 of this paper. 
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14  Wunsch-Vincent (2003) provides a good example of such behind-the-border measures. He documents the 
provisions contained in the U.S.-Singapore and U.S.-Chile FTAs on audio-visual services and argues that they 
comprise the U.S. vision of the rules for audiovisual services, standing in contrast to the approaches favoured by 
certain European countries to cultural diversity and associated matters.   10
environmental protections. Given the new dimensions of globalization, we need to 
demonstrate that trade rules can adapt to meet new needs and circumstances. Our 
FTAs level the playing field for U.S. businesses because others--especially the 
E.U.--negotiated a host of agreements in the 1990s while the U.S. stood on the 
sidelines. 
Elsewhere Mr. Zoellick has argued that it is the very high standards in its FTAs that make the 
United States' trading partners stand out as desirable investment locations.
15 The benefits, so 
the argument goes, of "winning" the game of Competitive Liberalization are not confined to 
potentially better access to U.S. markets. 
Foreign and security policy considerations have been given a clear place in current U.S. trade 
policy. Ambassador Zoellick has repeatedly stated that the United States has other goals than 
promoting trade and enhancing economic efficiency. His successor, Ambassador Portman, has 
continued this theme and an example is in some remarks he made at a roundtable discussion 
in 2006. Making specific reference to the Middle Eastern countries, he noted:  
The MEFTA countries are incredibly important so I do not want to the diminish 
the importance of a Bahrain [FTA] or an Oman [FTA] where we have real export 
opportunities, but also we have a larger interest in political stability and the 
promotion of prosperity and democracy in an important region. So our FTAs are 
not always strictly commercially based. Sometimes there are larger issues 
(Portman 2006). 
Yet an analysis of statements by U.S. officials suggests that a trading partner having a good 
foreign and security relationship with the United States is not a substitute for making the 
reforms necessary to obtain a FTA. For example, in remarks addressed to Egypt, a 
longstanding U.S. ally in the Middle East, Ambassador Zoellick made it clear that 
…I'm trying to send a signal, which is that there are some countries in the world 
that had an old think and that feel that political relationships are going to give 
them what they want economically. And they won't. They've got to make the 
reform… (Zoellick 2003a). 
Another consideration in the U.S. policy towards FTAs is that, legally-speaking, U.S. trade 
negotiators are not allowed to approach their foreign counterparts to seek the formal start of 
FTA negotiations. All such entreaties are supposed to come from the trading partner or 
partners.
16 While, as Feinberg (2003) has noted, this has made the United States essentially 
reactive in first instance, this posture gives the United States considerable negotiating clout 
should subsequent FTA negotiations with a trading partner prove difficult. After all, the 
United States can always point out that it did not seek this negotiation, with the implied threat 
that negotiations could be terminated if further concessions are not forthcoming from the 
trading partner. 
In sum, then, the United States expects from those trading partners seeking a FTA a typical 
package of market access-associated liberalisation plus a commitment to implement reforms 
(or evidence of implementation of reforms) over potentially a wide range of economic and 
political matters and support on foreign and security policy. This may well prompt the 
                                                           
15  We thank Ingo Borchert for pointing out to us that none of Mr. Zeollick's statements about U.S. goals 
concerning the incorporation of new rules into FTAs appear to take into account the level of development or the 
circumstances of the potential FTA signatory. We also thank Will Martin for pointing out that Mr. Zeollick's list 
omits the so-called TRIPs-plus commitments in pharmaceuticals.  
16 This does not prevent U.S. trade negotiators from informally consulting with foreign counterparts about the 
latter's desire to request the start of formal FTA negotiations, consultations in which the U.S. side may signal its 
receptiveness to such a request.   11
question as to what the United States is prepared to give in return for such FTAs. The answer, 
it seems, is relatively little as the following remark by Ambassador Zoellick makes clear: 
American openness is high and our trade barriers are low, so when we negotiate 
free trade agreements with our counterparts we almost always open other markets 
more than we must change our own (Zoellick 2001a, page 8). 
Ambassador Zoellick made these remarks at his confirmation hearings in January 2001, that 
is, before he even took up the post of USTR. Moreover, those developing countries 
considering seeking a FTA with the United States may already take advantage of the U.S. 
unilateral preference schemes for selected imported products. For these countries the tariff 
concessions by the United States in a FTA may well be even smaller. 
 
3.  Implementing Competitive Liberalization. 
Considerations of space necessarily make this account of the implementation of Competitive 
Liberalization a truncated one. Our focus here will principally be on the bilateral track of 
trade negotiations, if only because major new agreements at the regional and multilateral level 
have yet to be concluded during the Bush Administration's watch. This is not to say that 
developments in the Doha Round, the FTAA, or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) forum are necessarily insignificant. Moreover, our focus on bilateral deals will 
arguably short change discussions of unilateral U.S. initiatives, such as the African Growth 
and Opportunity Act. Readers might bear these caveats in mind when considering what 
follows. 
In the United States although trade agreements are typically negotiated by the executive 
branch it is Congress which has the ultimate authority to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations. In 2002 Congress granted the Bush Administration TPA until July 2005, which was 
subsequently extended until 30 June 2007. The Act governing TPA stipulates that the 
Administration must consult Congress throughout the negotiating process, and to that end a 
Congressional Oversight Group was formed. The President must also notify Congress 90 days 
before starting negotiations on a FTA and make an additional notification at least 90 days 
before his intention to enter into such an agreement.
17 Within 60 days of the entering into the 
trade agreement the President must also submit to Congress a list of the changes to U.S. laws 
that are needed to bring the United States into compliance with that agreement. Even though 
there is no deadline for submission of the implementing legislation to Congress, there is a 
presumption that once submitted Congress would vote to approve or reject the legislation in 
its entirety.
18  
Given the growing scope of FTAs the TPA-related procedures, therefore, require both 
considerable consultation between the departments of the Executive Branch (and not just the 
USTR) and Congress, as well as consultations among the former. The inter-agency process 
pursued by the Bush Administration is described in GAO (2004). 
U.S. officials assert that no mechanical formula is used to determine whether the United 
States should commence negotiations on a FTA with a foreign party. Even so, a number of 
relevant factors have been disclosed publicly. In a speech at the (then) Institute for 
International Economics in May 2003, Ambassador Zoellick identified the following 13 
factors that guide his evaluation of the suitability of starting negotiations with a foreign party: 
Congressional guidance; interest from U.S. business and agriculture; implications for 
                                                           
17 The latter notification requirement stretches to 180 days if the trade agreement envisages changes to the U.S. 
trade remedy laws. 
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sensitive products (such as textiles and sugar); evidence of political will on the part of the 
foreign party to implement the necessary trade reforms; the party's willingness to implement 
other market-oriented reforms; the party's commitment to any ongoing WTO and relevant 
regional negotiations; the contribution of an agreement with the foreign party to regional 
integration; the degree of support from U.S. civil society groups; the extent to which the 
foreign party cooperates with the United States on foreign and security policy; consideration 
of whether an agreement with the foreign party would counter other FTAs that put U.S. 
commercial interests at a disadvantage; the desire on the part of the United States to sign 
FTAs in every region of the world economy; the desire on the part of the United States to 
have FTAs with industrialised and developing countries; and, finally, the implications of any 
negotiation on the resources available to the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
(GAO 2004). 
It should be noted that Ambassador Zoellick stressed that no specific weights were attached to 
each factor and that the weight given to any factor may vary on a case-by-case basis. GAO 
(2004) contends that these 13 factors were used to select four trading partners in 2002 from 
those seeking to negotiate a FTA with the United States. 
Since 2002, however, it appears that the relevant agencies of the U.S. Executive Branch 
(principally, the Office of the United States Trade Representative and the Departments of 
State, Commerce, Agriculture, and Treasury) have employed six broad factors in evaluating 
the suitability of a trading partner for FTA negotiations with the United States (GAO 2004). 
The six factors are: "country readiness" (seen in terms of political will and support, trade 
policy, and the effectiveness of the rule of law); "economic and commercial benefit to the 
United States" (concerned with broader macroeconomic performance as well as potential 
sector-specific information); benefits to the United States' overall strategy for trade 
liberalisation; "compatibility with U.S. interests" (including not only foreign policy but also 
membership of the WTO and the conclusion of a TIFA); support from the U.S. Congress, 
private sector, and civil society; and U.S. governmental resource constraints. The third and 
fourth factors indicate, respectively, the importance given to linkages across levels of trade 
negotiations and foreign and security policy. 
GAO (2004) argues that "the interagency process for selecting FTA partners has become 
more systematic since 2002 and routinely considers input from Congress and the private 
sector" (page 2). Moreover, in May 2003 the National Security Council issued guidelines to 
"improve the process of assessing potential parties by, among other things, expanding the 
number of inter-agency groups involved with the assessments" (GAO 2004, page 13). 
GAO (2004) also reports that there are no thresholds for eligibility employed overall and with 
respect to any one of the factors listed above. The report notes: 
Key officials told us that the USTR's views are central but that the now-standard 
discussion of the factors permits each participating executive agency to contribute 
its perspective, thus potentially adding to the issues that the USTR must address in 
the future negotiations (page 10). 
In the light of these remarks it would not be at all surprising if, in fact, the range of provisions 
included in U.S. FTAs has grown over time. 
Finally, CRS (2006) reported that Ambassador Portman has indicated that the choice of new 
partners for FTAs would be influenced by the likelihood of completing negotiations before 
the expiration of TPA in June 2007. 
In addition to these general features, the implementation of Competitive Liberalization has 
acquired certain regional dimensions. Mention has already been made of the two track 
negotiating approach being pursued by the United States in Latin America. In the Middle   13
East, however, a multi-step strategy is being followed. On 9 May 2003 President Bush 
announced an initiative that seeks eventually to create a U.S.-Middle East Free Trade 
Agreement (MEFTA) by 2013. According to the USTR, in the first stage Middle Eastern 
countries that are not members of the WTO would accede to that organisation.
19 Then, nations 
would conclude TIFAs and BITs with the United States. Later once enough reforms had been 
undertaken, FTA negotiations might begin (USTR 2003b). 
Earlier, in October 2002, President Bush had announced an Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative. 
This offered the prospect to South East Asian countries with a strong commitment to 
economic reform the prospect of negotiating a FTA with the United States so long as these 
satisfy two conditions: namely, that the trading partner was a member of the WTO and that a 
TIFA had been concluded with the United States. In the longer term the stated U.S. goal is 
said to be to create a network of bilateral FTAs in the ASEAN region (USTR 2003a, page 
167). Both of these regional initiatives indicate that Middle Eastern and South East Asian 
nations must overcome a number of hurdles, and sometimes significant hurdles, before the 
prospect of a negotiation of a FTA arises. 
To date what has been the Bush Administration's record with respect to the negotiation, 
conclusion, and implementation of FTAs? Table 1 summarises (as of December 2006) the 
status of the FTAs that have been started or concluded during the presidency of Mr. George 
W. Bush. A total of 17 countries or groups of countries have participated in formal 
negotiations with the U.S. government since the Bush Administration took office. Of those 17 
initiatives, nine have been formally signed and six have come into force.  
Of the 17 initiatives only two involved members of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). Most of the negotiations, therefore, were with 
developing countries, in particular developing countries in Latin America and the Middle 
East. Only with the launching of negotiations with Korea and Malaysia has East Asian 
participation in the U.S. FTA initiatives begun to catch up with some other regions. Outside 
of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), no other Sub-Saharan African nation has 
been engaged in FTA negotiations with the United States. South Asia is not represented at all 
in Table 1. All in all, the distribution of U.S. FTA initiatives is very uneven across the regions 
of the world economy (especially when those regions are weighted by their respective 
populations). 
Another implication of the information presented in Table 1 is that, with FTAs with Colombia 
and Peru already concluded and the possibility that others may be concluded thereafter, 
Congress may have to legislate on several FTAs in 2007 and 2008. If the expiration of TPA 
accelerates FTA negotiations in 2007, then Congress could find itself considering an 
unprecedented number of signed FTAs in the coming years. Whether Congress will welcome 
such a legislative load, especially in the light of both the numerous trade sceptics elected to 
the House of Representatives in November 2006 and the run up to the presidential election of 
2008, is another matter.
20  
According to the website of the Office of the United States Trade Representative
21 the Bush 
Administration has also signed 24 TIFAs, adding to the 11 already in existence. The 
                                                           
19 Afghanistan, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen are not members of the WTO in that 
region. 
20 These comments should be read with those of Barfield (2005), see section 4 below. For further information on 
the positions taken by newcomers to the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate on trade-related 
matters, see Evenett and Meier (2006). 
21 Specifically, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/TIFA/Section_Index.html   14
signatories to these agreements are heavily skewed towards the Middle East and East Asia but 
with more African representation than is the case with FTA initiatives.
22 
News reports provide information on countries that in recent years have sought FTA 
negotiations with the United States, or have explored the possibility of such negotiations, and 
were ultimately rebuffed outright or deferred. Those countries (and there may well be others) 
include Egypt, Indonesia, Kuwait, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Sri Lanka, 
Switzerland, and Taiwan. As noted earlier, lack of reform (in particular with respect to the 
protection of intellectual property rights and customs related matters) was cited as the reason 
for rejecting Egypt's advances as well as concerns about political repression in the 2005 
election in that country.
23 The low likelihood of successfully completing an agricultural trade 
reform package acceptable to the United States is said to have accounted for the decision not 
to launch FTA negotiations with Switzerland. Korea's experience, however, suggests that 
doubts over the likely outcome of agricultural trade negotiations need not prevent the launch 
of FTA negotiations in the first place. 
Another country that was able to reverse a negative initial evaluation is the Dominican 
Republic. When FTA negotiations with the Central American nations were first proposed, the 
Dominican Republic sought to be included. In September 2002 Ambassador Zoellick rebuffed 
these advances noting that, while there was a good trading relationship, the Central American 
republics "have been some of the strongest supporters" of the United States in other trade 
negotiations. He added "we want to see that same support from the Dominican Republic at the 
WTO negotiations and the FTAA." The message appears to have been received clearly 
because press reports in early 2003 indicate that the Dominican Republic was working closely 
with the United States in both of these negotiations. On 8 April 2003 Ambassador Zoellick 
notified the U.S. Senate of the decision to initiate FTA negotiations with the Dominican 
Republic, which he described as a "reliable trade partner in the region" and in multilateral 
trade negotiations. 
Foreign and security policy considerations are thought to have played a role in rebuffing 
demarches from New Zealand and Taiwan. In the former case, despite strong U.S. 
Congressional support for starting negotiations on a FTA with New Zealand, which has been 
a goal of successive governments in Wellington since 1992, it was announced in 2003 that 
these talks would not take place. New Zealand's longstanding refusal to let nuclear warships 
into its ports, its decision not to lease 28 F-16 fighter jets in 2000, and the Clark Government's 
opposition to the second invasion of Iraq were all reported to be contributing factors. Having 
said that, U.S. officials publicly stated that negotiations on agricultural trade matters would 
have been very sensitive for them as New Zealand exports a number of farm products (such as 
beef, lamb, and dairy products) that are especially protected in the United States (Zoellick 
2003b, CRS 2006).
24 On 24 May 2003 the U.S. embassy in Wellington announced that the 
                                                           
22   The following nations or groups of nations have signed TIFAs with the United States during the 
Administration of Mr. George W. Bush: Afghanistan, Algeria, the Association of Southeast Asian (ASEAN) 
nations, Bahrain, Brunei, Cambodia, Central Asian Republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, the members of the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union 
(WEAMU), and Yemen. 
23 More generally we could find no country listed on the USTR's "301 Priority Watch List" for inadequate 
implementation or enactment of business-friendly economic laws that was able to secure the start of negotiations 
on a FTA with the United States. Egypt and Kuwait were on this list at the time they sought FTA negotiations 
with the United States. 
24 When asked by Representative Boehner about the prospects of negotiations with New Zealand, Ambassador 
Zoellick responded:   15
U.S. was not prepared to enter into negotiations on a FTA at that time, but did not rule out the 
possibility of a future negotiation. When New Zealand contributed troops to the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq the following month, the U.S. refused to draw any 
links to negotiations over a possible FTA (New Zealand Press Association 2003). 
Another interesting feature of the implementation of Competitive Liberalization in 2006, less 
than 18 months before the expiration of TPA, has been the threats made to those U.S. trading 
partners that are not perceived to be making enough concessions during FTA negotiations. 
These threats have been issued publicly by U.S. trade negotiators and elected officials. For 
example, after a week of negotiations with the Thais in January 2006 that yielded less than the 
United States expected, Inside U.S. Trade reported both the following remarks by Ms. 
Barbara Weisel, Assistant USTR for South East Asia and her subsequent travel plans: 
"We would like to be able to have the time that we need to conclude [the Thai] 
FTA but also to conclude new FTAs that we hope to launch and there's only so 
many of those we want going at the same time," she said. Weisel travelled to 
Malaysia after the Thai negotiations to discuss a possible FTA with government 
officials of that country, one of the four the U.S. is considering for an FTA (20 
January 2006). 
The following month it was the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) members that 
received a warning, this time from Ambassador Portman. This was reported by Inside U.S. 
Trade as follows: 
U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman this week held open the possibility that 
the U.S. would reconsider continuing formal negotiations with members of the 
Southern African Customs Union over those countries failure to agree to the scope 
of a deal. "We don't want to walk away by any means if there's interest," Portman 
told reporters…"We will continue to be there to engage but we have to keep our 
standards high." (10 February 2006). 
The following week similar sentiments were expressed by the Chairman of the U.S. House 
Ways and Means Committee, Congressman Bill Thomas. Inside U.S. Trade reported: 
House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Thomas (R-CA) this week said 
the U.S. should drop partners in free trade agreement negotiations if talks on those 
agreements are not progressing. At a Feb. 15 hearing on the U.S. trade agenda, he 
said the resources of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative would not be 
productively spent on "wooing" trading partners that refuse to agree to U.S. 
boiler-plate demands on FTAs.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
New Zealand is a challenge, Mr. Boehner. It is a challenge because when we set up the notice on 
Australia, there was put in a paragraph that said we sort of take a sense of Congress. But there 
really are kind of two issues that have caused some impediment. One is, just to be frank with the 
committee, a lot of their agricultural exports are ones that are very sensitive here; and we have to 
bring something back that we can get some broad-based support on. And if you start thinking 
about dairy and others, it is not the easiest thing to be able to carry here. Then the question is how 
we can handle that and whether we can handle it, given the overall relationship; and there are some 
things done recently that I think made that a little harder for us to carry. So we work very closely 
with New Zealand in the WTO. They are a good partner, and we continue to talk to them about 
prospects.  But right now our goal is to move forward with Australia (Zoellick 2003b). 
In addition to concerns about the "overall relationship" (that may be code for foreign and security policy 
disagreements), the statement strongly implies that opposition anticipated in one quarter of the U.S. Congress 
lead the USTR to put off negotiations on a free trade agreement with New Zealand. It would seem that rather 
than launch and conclude a negotiation for which Congressional ratification would be in considerable doubt, the 
Bush Administration prefers to avoid the negotiation in the first place.   16
Thomas mentioned rules on intellectual property rights and sanitary and 
phytosanitary barriers as examples of rules where some trading partners have 
refused to accept U.S. demands. Dropping partners from negotiations would 
create a sense of urgency in trading partners that would make it more likely that 
negotiations would be concluded, Thomas suggested…  
"We have to create a sense of timing if not urgency among some of our friends," 
Thomas said. He said this was also the case for ongoing and existing relationships 
(17 February 2006). 
Around the same time Ambassador Portman indicated that time was running out to complete 
the FTA negotiations with Panama.
25 
Some of the above threats have been followed through. For example, in April 2006 the Bush 
Administration suspended its FTA negotiations with SACU members, replacing them with a 
"work program" on trade and investment matters.
26 Subsequently, negotiations with Ecuador 
were postponed and then put in "deep freeze" as investment disputes between the parties 
worsened. Moreover, negotiations with Thai counterparts have been suspended until 
democratic government is restored in that country. As a result of these changes, by mid-2006 
the U.S. was only engaged in active bilateral negotiations with four trading partners. 
Assuming TPA is not extended, then as the June 2007 deadline approaches it will be 
interesting to see if the United States de facto or de jure ceases FTA negotiations with any 
more of its trading partners. 
 
4.  An overview of other assessments of Competitive Liberalization. 
Given the longstanding disagreement among scholars and trade policymakers over the choice 
between pursuing preferential or multilateral trade negotiations it should not be surprising that 
there is a wide spectrum of opinion concerning the U.S. trade policy of Competitive 
Liberalization. It is important to recall that Competitive Liberalization has bilateral, regional, 
and multilateral components and differs, in principle at least, from a purely preferential or a 
purely multilateral approach. In this short survey of the leading analyses of Competitive 
Liberalization it will be useful to start with the proponents of this approach to trade 
policymaking and then turn to other perspectives. 
Perhaps the most consistent and highest profile analyst in support of Competitive 
Liberalization is C. Fred Bergsten. In Bergsten (1996, 2002) he emphasises that countries are 
competing with one another for scarce investment resources and for access to foreign 
markets.
27  This competition has an important influence on the payoffs from different 
commercial policies. Economic reforms, especially in developing countries, are the key to 
securing such investment, he contends. These reforms can be codified in FTAs that act as a 
signal to the private sector.
28 Bergsten has long subscribed to the view that nations engage in a 
competition for liberalisation for fear of being left behind, especially in a time of mobile 
multinational capital (Bergsten 1996). 
                                                           
25 "Portman Signals Time Running Out To Finish Panama FTA This Year," Inside U.S. Trade, 17 February 
2006. 
26 "U.S. Drops FTA with SACU, Starts Trade and Investment Work Program," Inside U.S. Trade¸ 21 April 2006. 
27  The substitutability of products across trading partners, plus the differential tariff treatment created by a FTA 
and the potential effect on relative prices of products sourced from trading partners, are important features of the 
competition for market access. The large size of the U.S. economy may well add to the attraction of competing 
for access to the U.S. market. 
28 Schott (2004a) makes a similar argument.   17
Bergsten (2002) argues that there are benefits to be accrued from exploiting the linkages 
between trade negotiations at different levels, which is central to the policy of Competitive 
Liberalization. For Bergsten this is not just a matter of logic, it is an approach to trade policy 
strategy making that has delivered results before. In his view the interaction between 
developments on the multilateral and regional tracks have been central to trade policymaking 
since the 1960s, as this quotation from Bergsten (1996) makes clear: 
Much of the political economy of competitive liberalization in recent years has in 
fact played itself out in the dynamic interaction between regional and global 
initiatives to reduce trade barriers. This creative tension has been present 
throughout most of the postwar period. The United States initiated the Kennedy 
Round in the 1960s to counter the discrimination inherent in the creation of the 
European Common Market (as well as for broad foreign policy reasons) and the 
Tokyo Round in the 1970s to counter the additional discrimination from the 
Community's expansion to include the United Kingdom. The Europeans 
cooperated in both ventures and thus enabled the regional and global efforts to 
"ratchet up" the scope and pace of liberalization. 
The positive interaction between the two strategies accelerated sharply in the 
1980s and 1990s as competitive liberalization became the norm and countries 
searched for tactics to obtain the needed domestic support. The United States 
reversed its traditional aversion to regionalism by embracing free trade 
agreements with Israel and Canada after the European Community blocked the 
launch of new negotiations in the GATT--to which the EC responded by dropping 
its veto and permitting the Uruguay Round to begin. When the Round faltered in 
the late 1980s, the three North American countries launched NAFTA and the 
Asians initiated APEC. When the Round almost failed to meet its final deadline in 
December 1993, APEC's initial summit in Seattle in November 1993 induced the 
Community to finally agree because, according to one top European negotiator, it 
"demonstrated that you had an alternative and we did not." The regional initiatives 
also reinforced each other: APEC's Bogor Declaration was instrumental in 
galvanizing the Miami summit, a few weeks later, to commit to free trade by a 
certain date in the Americas… 
Hence regional and global liberalization initiatives have been mutually reinforcing 
throughout the past three decades or more. The fears of some observers that 
regionalism would derail globalism have been demonstrably overcome (page 4). 
The APEC-NAFTA-GATT interaction described above that took place at the end of the 
Uruguay Round is often referred to as the Triple Play. It is noteworthy how often the Triple 
Play is referred to by authors based in North America as evidence in support of the apparent 
logic of Competitive Liberalization, or at least to the proposition that certain regional trade 
initiatives can spur multilateral trade reforms: see Cooper (2004), Destler (2005), Schott 
(2004b, 2006), Steinberg (1998), and significantly Zoellick (2001c). It seems that much turns 
on this proposition, a point we return to below in our own evaluation. 
A related point made by Bergsten is that it is false to think of the alternative to multilateralism 
as "standing still" (or no change.) He subscribes to a variant of the so-called bicycle theory of 
trade reform whereby a failure to move forward risks encouraging protectionism (which 
presumably amounts to moving backwards). So the argument goes, if multilateralism is 
stalled at a point in time then bilateralism and regional initiatives are needed to prevent 
backsliding into protectionism (Bergsten 1996). 
Bergsten is well aware that preferential trade reform, be it regional or bilateral, can 
discriminate against outsiders, the consequences of which Viner (1950) analysed long ago. In   18
Bergsten (1996) he argues, however, that the trade diversion losses will be made up by the 
increased trade that follows from economic growth within the preferential trading area. Alas 
no empirical evidence or theoretical proof is given to support this proposition. What is 
perhaps more unconvincing about this line of argument is that it is precisely the trade 
diversion losses that are one important form of pressure on "outsiders" to join in the game of 
Competitive Liberalization. 
Another earlier analysis of Competitive Liberalization, which pre-dates the Administration of 
George W. Bush, was by Steinberg (1998). Steinberg sees Competitive Liberalization as the 
less preferable of two alternative futures for the world trading system (his preferred option 
being that the "transatlantic powers will cooperate and combine their power in the pursuit of 
liberal multilateralism" (page 256)). He perceives three drawbacks with Competitive 
Liberalization as a trade negotiating dynamic and strategy. First, that those parties which gain 
from trade diversion in bilateral and regional trade agreements could start opposing future 
trade reform (both multilateral and preferential) so as to protect their rents. Second, there is a 
risk that each region will create its own set of rules and negotiations--it's own "style" of 
capitalism as he puts it--which becomes difficult to reconcile in subsequent trade negotiations. 
The third weakness is that large regional groupings may develop strong incentives to raise 
trade barriers against third parties. 
Feinberg (2003) offers an early and in many respects prescient analysis of the U.S. shifts 
towards negotiating free trade agreements. Of particular interest is his analysis of the first 
twelve preferential trade initiatives that the United States has been involved in, from the U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement through to the negotiations on a free trade agreement with 
Morocco.
29 Feinberg assesses the non-market access factors that might have contributed to the 
United States' interest in a given preferential trade initiative. He identifies five such factors: 
the presence of democratic political institutions (or progress towards them at the time the 
trade accord was envisaged or concluded); significant market-oriented economic reforms in 
place or in progress; long-standing U.S. security interests or concerns; the likelihood that an 
accord would establish precedents for future trade negotiations; and whether the trading 
partners has considerable economic weight or regional leadership or prestige. He found that 
all twelve preferential trade initiatives met at least two American goals beyond expanding 
market access for U.S. firms, and many initiatives met three goals. This outcome reflects, 
Feinberg argues, the pluralistic nature of U.S. trade policymaking where many competing 
interests impinge upon the decisions taken by the U.S. executive branch. He also contents that 
timing matters, with the U.S. engaging in negotiations on bilateral free trade agreements to 
support ongoing and expected future regional trade initiatives. In this manner, the U.S. is said 
to be moving towards a policy of sequential regionalism. 
A cautious assessment of the policy of Competitive Liberalization is given by Hufbauer and 
Wong (2004). Having noted that the effect of this policy on an "outsider's" exports is a key 
element of the dynamic, Hufbauer and Wong wonder if "insiders" will at some point "prefer 
to keep the club doors closed." For these authors it is an empirical question as to whether 
pressure from outsiders to join exceeds any recalcitrance from insiders. And, worse still, a full 
assessment will not be possible, they argue, until the conclusion of the Doha Round and the 
FTAA negotiations. Only then, they note, "can we evaluate whether bilateral FTAs delivered 
on the promise of competitive liberalization or whether they simply sidetracked the world into 
shallow, face-saving agreements." 
Schott (2004b) provides an informative account of the U.S. trade policy towards Competitive 
Liberalization and describes the factors influencing the selection of trade partners for FTA 
                                                           
29   Feinberg's analysis also includes the Asia Pacific Cooperation Forum initiatives on trade, although 
deliberations in that forum were not expected to yield a binding free trade agreement.   19
negotiations with the United States. Schott emphasises the enhanced coordination between the 
executive agencies that this trade policy requires and the "cacophony of stated policy goals 
that result"; an outcome that makes, in his view, coherent policy formation difficult. He notes 
that the bargaining U.S. trade officials undertake at home is probably more difficult than that 
abroad, especially as there is little domestic agreement on which goals should take priority. 
Schott (2004b) argues that the results of U.S. bilateral initiatives have been mixed. Some 
initiatives seem to be steps towards larger free trade pacts in the Western hemisphere, of 
which he approves. Other initiatives have had little reward in economic or foreign policy 
terms. Schott (2004b) prefers a more aggressive policy of negotiating free trade agreements 
directly with Brazil and Korea, hoping thereby to unlock Competitive Liberalization 
dynamics in their respective regions.
30 
Barfield (2005) identifies and discusses four challenges faced by the Bush Administration as 
it implements the policy of Competitive Liberalization in its second term. Like Destler (2005), 
Barfield notes the growing partisan nature of votes on trade policy matters in the U.S. 
Congress, especially in the U.S. House of Representatives. The Administration has relied 
primarily on the support of only Republican congressmen and women for legislative trade 
measures, including those Republicans with specific interests to protect. This, in turn, has 
influenced the concessions that the Administration can make to trading partners (and, as 
argued in the next paragraph, the demands made on trading partners) in negotiations on free 
trade agreements. Liberalisation of trade barriers to beef and lamb imports were postponed for 
nearly 20 years in the free trade agreement with Australia. Similar constraints on improved 
access to the U.S. market for fibre and cotton products were found in the U.S.-Central 
America Free Trade Agreement. Another drawback is that partisan divisions on trade policy 
matters have increased the number of votes taken, each eating away at the pro-trade political 
capital that exists. 
A second challenge is coping with the tendency of many influential players in the United 
States to "load up" free trade agreements with what Barfield calls "peripheral issues." These 
provisions, he argues, have added to the partisan rancour on trade policy and hastened "trade 
policy fatigue" among U.S. elected representatives. A third challenge is to make sure that the 
same factors which have impeded progress in the multilateral trade negotiations do not 
impede regional initiatives, as appears to be the case in the FTAA negotiations. If this 
challenge is not met, the outcome is likely to be a patchwork of sub-regional trade agreements 
each with its own variant of the rules, which add costs to business and ultimately distort 
market forces. 
The last challenge perceived by Barfield is the fast spread of regionalism in East Asia and the 
pivotal role of China in this regard. In his view the U.S. has failed to articulate an adequate 
response, especially to the Chinese "threat" of hegemony in the region. U.S. reliance on 
APEC or Competitive Liberalization (including the EAI) have not served U.S. interests well. 
While not claiming to present specific answers of his own, Barfield wonders if U.S. free trade 
agreements in East Asia might be more viable if labour and environmental standards were 
omitted. 
Jagdish Bhagwati has repeatedly opposed the U.S. policy of Competitive Liberalization. In 
addition to his long-standing, and often articulated, criticisms of preferential trade 
agreements, in testimony to the U.S. Congress in April 2002, Bhagwati argues that the "chief 
argument" against current U.S. trade policy towards free trade agreements is that they are 
being used to establish templates that include non-market access provisions (Bhagwati 2002). 
                                                           
30 Schott (2004a) argues that free trade agreements pose little threat to the multilateral trading system if the 
following three conditions hold: the free trade agreement's coverage is comprehensive; rules of origin are kept to 
a minimum; and if the contracting parties are committed to further multilateral trade negotiations.   20
These templates are used for further preferential and multilateral trade negotiations. Bhagwati 
argues that this policy amounts to one of "divide and rule," that is, using preferential trade 
agreements to undermine (essentially developing country) opposition to negotiating accords 
on what he sees as "non-trade" matters at the World Trade Organization, which he too 
believes is a mistake.
31 Bhagwati cites the provisions on capital controls in the U.S. free trade 
agreements with Singapore and Chile as examples of this tactic, along with intellectual 
property rights and labour and environmental provisions in the earlier free trade agreements 
that the U.S. has signed. 
This review of the existing analyses of Competitive Liberalization indicates a divergence of 
views as to the efficacy of this trade policy. Perhaps, surprisingly, these analyses have not 
addressed what appear to us to be some first order questions. For example, what evidence is 
there that this policy has indeed created a contest for access to the large United States market? 
Likewise, do foreign policymakers take into account their relative position vis-à-vis other 
foreigners when formulating their strategy towards FTA negotiations with the United States? 
To what extent does the United States' stated intention to sign many free trade agreements and 
the importance it attaches to foreign and security policy goals and to non-market access-
related provisions undermine the incentive of foreign governments to participate in the 
"contest" in the first place? More generally, do the multiple objectives of the U.S. policy of 
Competitive Liberalization conflict with one another?
32 These and other matters are addressed 
in the next section, which contains our assessment of Competitive Liberalization. 
 
 
5.  Assessing Competitive Liberalization on its own terms. 
Bearing in mind that the Bush Administration's second term is not yet completed it is 
important to state upfront that any current assessment of the policy of Competitive 
Liberalization is an interim one. Moreover, should either the Doha Development Round or the 
FTAA negotiations ever be concluded, a dispassionate future assessment of current U.S. trade 
policy ought to take these developments into account and should consider the role, if any, 
Competitive Liberalization has played in bringing about such outcomes. Having said that, 
after five years of pursuing this policy there should now be sufficient information to conduct 
an evaluation of some sort. Rather than rehash the longstanding and important debate on the 
relative merits of preferential and multilateral trade initiatives, here we will assess 
Competitive Liberalization on its own terms.
33 We also ask if this policy is coherent, that is, 
do the incentives created by this policy help attain its stated goals? 
As noted in section 2 one important aspect of Competitive Liberalization is to induce a 
competition among the U.S. trading partners for access to the large American economy. 
Winners of this contest were supposed to garner more foreign direct investment and exports, 
both of which may have been diverted from losers. The loss of international commerce is said 
to put pressure on the losers to participate in the contest more enthusiastically in the future (by 
offering to liberalise more). On this logic countries are concerned not just with their absolute 
position with respect to the U.S. market and American foreign investors but also with their 
relative position vis-à-vis other U.S. trading partners. 
                                                           
31 Therefore, Bhagwati is criticising both the substance and the tactics employed by the United States. 
32 This is a distinct point from that made by some in this section that the number of objectives appears to have 
increased over time. 
33 This is one of the reasons why we took the trouble to document the goals and strategy of this policy as 
articulated by the policy's proponents.   21
Supporters of Competitive Liberalization might point to the 16 negotiations for free trade 
agreements started by the Bush Administration, and the dozen or so entreaties from U.S. 
trading partiers to commence similar negotiations, as evidence that this competition is in full 
swing. The difficulty with this argument is that it does not demonstrate that countries had 
protecting their relative position in mind when they approached the U.S. for a preferential 
trade agreement. 
Perhaps a more direct test is to examine whether non-U.S. policymakers, business 
associations, journalists, and trade experts specifically refer to their country's relative position 
in discussions over its preferred trade policy with the United States. Such statements about 
relative position may shed light on the extent and nature to which a competition for access to 
the U.S. market is perceived by the United States' trading partners. Using widely available 
electronic search engines, for each of the U.S. trading partners that have sought or begun 
negotiations on a free trade agreement with the Bush Administration, we searched from 2001 
to mid-2006 for public statements, newspaper articles, etc, that suggested that country had its 
commercial position relative to other countries in mind when it considered its trade policies 
towards the United States. Generic statements about wanting to attract more foreign direct 
investment or boosting exports were set aside, unless specific reference was made as to how a 
trade agreement or negotiation could advance a country's commercial position compared to 
another country. Below is the entirety of what we found: 
1.  A statement in August 2003 by the Honduran Ambassador to the United States that his 
country fought for a place at the negotiating table with the U.S. arguing that, unlike others in 
Latin America, his country was ready and able to reform.
34 
2.  An Australian newspaper article in January 2001 stating that Australia's government 
recognises that it is falling behind a "growing field of suitors" for trade agreements with the 
United States, including Singapore, Korea, and Chile. The same article contents that Chilean 
officials bitterly complained that Singapore had taken its place at the head of the queue.
35 
3.  A number of statements in 2001 by New Zealanders that Australia is moving ahead of it in 
terms of free trade negotiations with the United States.
36 
4.  A statement by an Egyptian minister in November 2002 that that country's exporters are 
losing market share in the U.S. to Jordanian rivals.
37 
5.  A statement by the Korea Trade Institute in November 2003 to the effect that U.S. free 
trade agreements were putting Korean exporters at a disadvantage.
38 
6.  A summary of a report issued by a leading Korean institute which stated that Korea is 
being left out of the trend towards signing free trade agreements.
39 
7.  Several statements in the first half of 2005 by Mr. Evo Morales, President of Bolivia, that 
the recently concluded U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement would reduce Bolivian exports of 
                                                           
34 Jeffrey Sparshott, "U.S. eyes bilateral option in trade ties," The Washington Times 6 August 2003. 
35 "Australia Eyes US Trade Policy Direction," Australian Financial Review, 22 January 2001. 
36 See, for example, "Fear From Australia-US Free Trade Deal Grows in New Zealand," Xinhua News Agency, 
13 August 2001; "NZ PM Clark Calls For Australia, NZ Cooperation on US," Dow Jones International News, 28 
May 2002; "NZ Fears Economic Damage If Left Out of US, Australia FTA," Dow Jones International News, 29 
August 2002; "NZ To Step Up Free Trade Lobbying," Dominion Post, 16 November 2002. 
37 "Getting Serious About An FTA," Business Today, 1 November 2002. 
38 "Absence of FTA Driving Korean Products Out of US," Korea Times, 4 November 2003. 
39 "Feasibility and Economic Effects of Korea-U.S. FTA," Korea Institute for International Economic Policy. 
Downloaded from www.kiep.go.kr on 7 June 2006.   22
soybean to Colombia. In 2005 Colombia paid U.S.$170 million for 40 percent of Bolivia's 
soybean exports.
40 
8.  An unattributed statement that Caribbean countries feared that the implementation of 
CAFTA would erode their preferential access to the U.S. market.
41 
That is, after reading through literally hundreds of documents, press releases, and statements 
on such matters, we found only eight types of statement that articulate trade policy options for 
a country in terms of its relative position. Admittedly our searches were based on English-
language sources. Even so, this is not a terribly high yield especially bearing in mind that 
many countries where English is not an official language of government have an English 
language business newspaper. 
What can we conclude from this evidence? Clearly it would be incorrect to assert that the 
apparent logic of Competitive Liberalization has not resonated with any observers in U.S. 
trading partners. Yet it seems equally absurd to argue that jockeying for a better position vis-
à-vis other nations has been a pervasive theme among statements made by foreign nations in 
the context of any actual or desired trade negotiations with the United States. Put another way, 
if there is a ferocious contest for better access to the large U.S. market then many (most?) 
U.S. trading partners and foreign analysts are being very quiet about it. Perhaps an alternative 
explanation is that a few of the U.S. trading partners see themselves competing with a small 
number of other countries for access for the U.S. market. Or maybe the rhetoric of 
Competitive Liberalization has not made much of an impression outside of the Beltway? 
Another possibility is that the competitive logic is fashionable among trade negotiators, a few 
trade policy analysts, and a sprinkling of others. 
Yet another explanation could be that, despite all the rhetoric of a competition, U.S. trading 
partners discount the benefits of better access to the U.S. market that arise at the expense of 
other trading partners. Can this perception be rationalised? Arguably yes and this is where the 
combination of the U.S. stated goal of negotiating lots of free trade agreements and the 
assumption that current losers from contests for U.S. market access will strive harder to seek 
an agreement with the United States in the future is important. One could argue as follows: If 
country A knows that its winning of the contest for access to the U.S. market will result in 
substantial losses for another country B then, on the stated logic of Competitive 
Liberalization, A will consider it likely that B will seek, or seek with greater zeal, a free trade 
agreement with the United States--if only so that B can offset some of the losses mentioned 
earlier. Country A might then expect that some, perhaps a large proportion, of the gains from 
winning the contest will be short lived, for if and when the U.S. concludes a free trade 
agreement with B then the margin of preference enjoyed by A will decline. It is precisely 
because the United States has stated that it wants to sign lots of free trade agreements, as part 
of stimulating an ever wider contest for its markets, that country A knows that the U.S. is 
unlikely to decline a sufficiently attractive offer from country B. The long term benefit for 
country A, then, from its agreement with the U.S. is that part of its gains which are not 
undermined by other potential free trade agreements that the U.S. might sign in the future.
42 
                                                           
40 See, for example, "Bolivia: Morales gets halfway with Uribe," Latinnews Daily, 15 March 2006; "Bolivian 
President To Discuss Soybean Exports with Colombia, USA," Latin America News Digest, 28 March 2006; 
"Colombian president arrives in Bolivia on one-day visit," BBC Monitoring Newsfile, 14 March 2006. 
41 "CARICOM Members Seek Special Treatment in FTA Talks with U.S." Inside U.S. Trade, 14 April 2006. 
42 The speed or rate at which the United States signs FTAs importantly affects the strength of this argument. If 
the U.S. signs FTAs quite slowly then country A may well decide that being "on the inside track" (with the 
USA) is worth it, at least for the long-lasting transitional benefits. Alternatively, if there is some uncertainty over 
the speed with which the United States will be able to sign FTAs and, perhaps even uncertainty over which 
nations it can sign FTAs with, then a country A may discount the likelihood that the benefits of signing an FTA 
with the United States will diminish rapidly. We thank Sheila Page for pointing out this argument.   23
Pre-announced promiscuity by the United States undermines the scarcity value of its free 
trade agreements and encourages potential trading partners to place greater weight on those 
benefits of an agreement with the United States that cannot be diluted by any future 
agreements that the U.S. might sign. This, in turn, will influence the incentive of trading 
partners to engage in the contest in the first place. 
In considering the potential for trade to be diverted in free trade agreements between the U.S. 
and developing countries, as Schott (2004a, 2006) has repeatedly argued, the effect of pre-
existing U.S. unilateral preference schemes need to be taken into account. Suppose two 
developing countries receive duty free access to the U.S. market under the latter schemes. If 
one of these developing countries goes on to sign a free trade agreement with the United 
States, in the absence of any uncertainty about the original unilateral preferences being 
maintained, there may not be a market access improvement for the developing country in an 
absolute or relative sense.
43 This implies that the developing country which did not sign the 
free trade agreement with the United States may suffer no export loss, which is hardly an 
inducement to join the competition for access to the U.S. market in the future.
44 Perhaps it is 
for this reason that Schott (2004a) has argued that forgone foreign direct investment is the 
price that non-participating and losing countries pay. Moreover, according to Schott, FTAs 
with the U.S. are a way for developing countries to undertake, reinforce, or anchor broad-
based economic reforms which, along with increasing foreign direct investment, are likely to 
have other payoffs to the countries concerned. Even so, on this view, the contest is primarily 
for investment and not for market access. 
While many empirical studies claim to find that free trade agreements stimulate foreign direct 
investment inflows, they also show that such agreements are just one of many factors which 
influence the levels of such inflows. Therefore, a developing country may rationally decide 
that, as far as increasing foreign direct investment is concerned, other measures (including 
unilateral economic reforms) are preferred to taking on the obligations of a "gold standard" 
free trade agreement with the United States and may take effect faster than it takes to 
participate in the contest for such a free trade agreement, conclude the associated agreement, 
and wait for it to come into force. This is not to say that U.S. free trade agreements contain no 
"seal of approval" for investors, just that those investors may respond to other incentives; in 
which case the desire of many developing countries to participate in the contest for the U.S. 
market will depend on their evaluation of the relative strength of different determinants of 
foreign direct investment. There is no reason a proiri why an agreement with the United 
States must be the most powerful lever. 
Another purported advantage of Competitive Liberalization is that bilateral agreements are 
supposed to build pressure for progress with regional trade initiatives. In recent years much of 
the U.S. trade strategy for Latin America seems predicated on this assumption, in particular 
after the FTAA negotiations stalled. Yet there are doubts that the steps taken to date have 
substantially altered the calculus in negotiations for a FTAA. Destler (2005), for one, is a 
sceptic.
45 Perhaps more importantly, advocates of Competitive Liberalization place great store 
                                                           
43 Sébastien Mirodout pointed out to us that the U.S. preference schemes refer only to goods and in contrast that 
U.S. FTAs tend to include provisions allowing for greater access to American services markets than is permitted 
under the multilateral General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). In which case, access to U.S. service 
markets may be one element of the competition between nations, somewhat modifying the conclusion of Schott 
that the contest is primary for foreign direct investment. 
44 Alternatively, if any additional benefits from a FTA with the United States over and above the existing GSP 
regimes are subject to very long implementation periods in the United States, then the present discounted value 
of the benefits to the developing country's greater market access to the United States is diminished. We thank 
James Mathis for pointing this out to us. 
45 He argues on page 300:   24
on competing regional initiatives helping to push forward multilateral trade liberalisation. 
Proponents put a lot of weight on the historical precedent of the so-called Triple Play 
(explained earlier) as the gambit which closed the Uruguay Round of multilateral 
negotiations. We might have been reassured if this reading of history was universally 
accepted. However, it is not. de Jonquières (2004), the former World Trade Editor of the 
Financial Times, casts doubt on this interpretation of events and arguably was very well 
placed to judge the factors responsible for concluding the Uruguay Round. This paper is not 
the place to explore this matter adequately (our purpose here is different). Suffice it to say that 
if the proponents reading of history of the Uruguay Round is incorrect, there must surely be 
question marks over the likelihood of the current Competitive Liberalization strategy 
eventually inducing the European Union and Japan to make concessions at the negotiating 
table in the Doha Round talks. Even if this reading of history is correct, at present the United 
States is a long way from having credible, economically-significant alternative regional 
strategies that its trading partners might have thought it had had in the early 1990s.
46 In sum, 
to date it is difficult to credit Competitive Liberalization with converting negotiating 
successes at one negotiating level into pressure for successes in other negotiating levels. 
Turning now to the foreign and security policy considerations, first we need to recognise that 
there is an existing literature of considerable vintage concerning the appropriate relationship 
between trade and foreign policy. Rather than summarise that literature here, we will make a 
few observations that are specific to the implementation of current U.S. policy towards free 
trade agreements. Recall that one use of the latter are as inducements to trading partners to 
align themselves with U.S. foreign and security policy objectives. The first point to make is 
that free trade agreements are a rather crude instrument to employ in this respect, not least 
because such accords are in principle irreversible. Once an agreement has been concluded, the 
incentive to align with U.S. foreign policies ceases. This is not merely a hypothetical concern. 
Despite signing the North American Free Trade Agreement in the early 1990s, neither Canada 
nor Mexico contributed to Operation Iraqi Freedom (the second invasion of Iraq led by the 
United States).
47 
The second point to be made is that the higher the foreign and security policy hurdle that U.S. 
trading partners must clear, the smaller the number of nations that can participate in the 
contest for access to the large U.S. economy. The market access-related and economic 
reform-related benefits to the U.S. of the policy of Competitive Liberalization are attenuated 
by tough foreign policy "affinity" tests.  
The third observation is that the lack of clarity as to what precisely foreign and security steps 
the U.S. values from its trading partners creates uncertainty which may undermine those 
trading partners' incentives to engage in trade and other reforms. New Zealand's present 
predicament is a case in point. Suppose New Zealand wanted to meet whatever foreign policy 
test the U.S. employs. Given that New Zealand's decision to send troops to Iraq and 
Afghanistan to assist with those nations reconstruction is not enough to secure negotiations 
for a free trade agreement, what is? How long must New Zealand align itself with U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
…it is implausible that CAFTA, for example, could generate the pressure for liberalization in the 
2000s that NAFTA and APEC had exerted on the European Union at the close of the Uruguay 
Round in 1993. 
46  Although it is worth noting that Jeffrey J. Schott and C. Fred Bergsten have, respectively, called for a 
deepening of the NAFTA agreement and the negotiation of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP); see 
Schott (2005) and Bergsten (2005, 2006). If either of these proposals became official U.S. trade policy and the 
relevant trading parties were ready to seriously explore these options, then the conclusion that the U.S. has no 
alternative credible wide-ranging regional strategies (to the multilateral negotiating track) would have to be 
revisited. Aggarwal (2006) presents an alternative, sceptical U.S. perspective on the prospects for a FTAAP. 
47 In the spirit of completeness, however, it  should be noted that Canada has sent troops to Afghanistan after the 
U.S. invasion of that country. We thank Jeffrey J. Schott for reminding us of this fact.   25
foreign policy goals before the United States government forgives the former's sins? In the 
absence of good answers to these questions, one could understand a decision by New Zealand 
to seek free trade agreements with other nations. This is a reminder, of course, that the U.S. is 
not the only jurisdiction with a large economy in the world and not the only negotiator of free 
trade agreements. The question must surely arise as to whether U.S. foreign and security 
policy requirements are enabling other large economies to undercut American trade 
negotiators? If so, the U.S. may unwittingly be supporting the proliferation of other types of 
free trade agreement, which may not be in the U.S. commercial or foreign policy interests.
48 
The foregoing considerations raise a more fundamental question: is the United States 
expecting its policy on free trade agreements to bear the weight of too many objectives? It is 
not just a matter of degree to which foreign and commercial policy considerations are mixed 
as many of the concerns raised above about foreign policy also apply to the market-oriented 
reforms that the U.S. likes to see its trading partners implement.
49 Perhaps greater emphasis 
could be placed on other vehicles, such as bilateral aid or programmes from the regional and 
multilateral development banks, that might just as well promote the economic reforms abroad 
that the United States wishes to see implemented.
50  If one cannot reduce the number of 
elephants that must dance on a pin's head, then maybe an increase in the number of pins is 
called for. 
It is worth dwelling on why so many objectives have been loaded on to U.S. policies towards 
free trade agreements. As Barfield (2005) and others have argued, the need to keep so many 
disparate interests within Congress and the Bush Administration "on board" with current U.S. 
trade policy probably accounts for the large number of non-market access-related factors that 
                                                           
48 A related point is whether China's current FTA policy, which appears to have far less foreign policy-related 
demands than that of the United States, is effectively undercutting U.S. FTA initiatives. If so, it would be a 
mistake to view the contest for U.S. market access as the only potential competition taking place in the 
international trading arena. For those enamoured with the ideas of trade policy-related competitions surely they 
should be open to the possibility that there could be a contest between the major trading partners (China, U.S., 
Japan, and the European Union) for access to other countries' markets. On this logic, the major trading partners 
could be conceived as competing along four dimensions: the extent of access to own markets offered, the extent 
of access demanded from foreign trading partners, the extent to which foreign trading partners have to 
implement so-called inside-the-border measures, and the extent to which foreign trading partners support the 
foreign and security policy goals of the major trading powers. Demands by the U.S. along one dimension that are 
in excess of other major trading partners would, in order for U.S. free trade agreements to remain viable, require 
greater concessions by the U.S. along one or more other dimensions. If these considerations are correct, they are 
also likely to have implications for the European Union's policies towards free trade agreements, which too has 
foreign policy and behind-the-border components. One feature of the FTA landscape worth watching in the years 
to come is whether the United States and European Union modify their FTA policies in response to the "entry" 
of less picky FTA "suppliers" such as China and (possibly) Japan. 
49  Helleiner (1996) provided an early warning of developing country worries about having to comply with 
demands for market reforms made by industrial countries during the negotiation of FTAs. 
50 We thank Jeffrey J. Schott for reminding us that bilateral aid appropriations to support reforms in developing 
countries would be "on-budget" (that is, part of the outlays of the U.S. government) and that this differs from 
"off-budget" initiatives, such as measures contained in trade agreements. Schott argued (in an email 
communication with the authors) that "[t]rade carrots and sticks are often pursued precisely because they don't 
involve budgetary outlays." This may be true, but the fact that some U.S. FTAs have been complemented by aid 
packages to foreign signatories suggests that trade measures may effectively have off-budget and on-budget 
components. Nevertheless, our point in the main text is that, given the limited apparent foreign appetite for these 
trade-related carrots, Congress may wish to reconsider whether trade initiatives are the most effective means for 
advancing certain economic reforms in U.S. trading partners and whether greater reliance on other measures 
(such as on-budget aid support) might have greater purchase. Having said that, we are under no illusion about the 
scepticism towards U.S. aid spending among the U.S. Congress and the American public at large. Indeed, our 
mention in the main text of initiatives by the development banks reflects the fact that another alternative vehicle 
for promoting reform is available. In this respect, the strong support given by the current U.S. administration to 
the World Bank's Doing Business initiative, which seeks to reform the legal underpinnings and regulations and 
associated enforcement of the business environment in developing countries, is a case in point.   26
condition this policy and associated negotiations. The other side of the coin, then, of seeking 
"gold-standard" free trade agreements are disagreements in Washington over the central 
priorities for negotiations concerning free trade agreements. It seems that U.S. trade 
negotiators have not been in a position to deny, or head off, many competing demands made 
of them during negotiations for free trade agreements. The reputed toughness of American 
trade negotiators towards their trading partners may well reflect the former's parlous status on 
the Washington totem pole. It may be useful here to consider a counterfactual. If a more 
focused U.S. trade policy was widely accepted as being of sufficient commercial value to the 
United States then would more U.S. trading partners request the start of negotiations for free 
trade agreements? Could less (conditions) yield more (agreements)? After five years of 
implementing Competitive Liberalization observers are also entitled to ask if demanding more 
of U.S. trading partners has strengthened the pro-trade lobby in the United States or just 
encouraged that lobby to make further demands of U.S. trading partners? 
Our assessment of Competitive Liberalization has evaluated this initiative on its own terms 
taking into account the constraints and circumstances facing trade negotiators in the United 
States and abroad. We acknowledge that any assessment at this stage is an interim one, yet 
after five years of implementation a successful policy initiative should be able to withstand 
scrutiny. In this section we have expressed some reservations (i) about whether many foreign 
policymakers perceive there is a contest for access to the U.S. market in the first place, (ii) 
about the internal logic of Competitive Liberalization, in particular the potential tensions 
between the foreign and security policy goals, the requirement of substantial economic 
reforms, and the objective of inducing the widest possible contest for access to the large U.S. 
market, and (iii) whether internal differences within the U.S. legislative and executive 
branches have compromised this policy initiative from the very beginning. 
 
6. Concluding  remarks. 
When the Administration of President George W. Bush took office in January 2001 the U.S. 
executive branch had been without trade negotiating authority from Congress for six years. It 
is unsurprising, therefore, that the newly appointed U.S. trade officials put a high priority on 
being granted this authority and perhaps felt they needed a compelling narrative to explain 
why that authority should be granted and how it would be subsequently used. Competitive 
Liberalization was adopted as the credo of the Bush Administration's trade officials and it 
contained a sequential logic linking negotiations, and therefore potentially trade liberalisation, 
across different levels (bilateral, regional, and multilateral). Since its first articulation over 
five years ago, no alternative vision for U.S. trade policy has been subsequently put forward.  
The purpose of this paper is to characterise this policy, to describe its implementation, to 
discuss how others have assessed it, and then to offer an assessment of our own. It should be 
borne in mind that, as noted in the Introduction, the phrase Competitive Liberalization 
predates the current U.S. Administration and has been used to refer to both a trade policy 
strategy and a set of dynamics and pressures facing states during the current era of 
globalisation (Bergsten 1996, Steinberg 1998). Our focus here has principally been on 
assessing the implementation of the policy of Competitive Liberalization by the 
Administration of President George W. Bush. 
There is no doubt that U.S. trade negotiators have been very active since 2001. By the end of 
2006, 18 negotiations for free trade agreements have been started, concluded, or ratified. (Five 
of these agreements have since come into force.) U.S. trade officials have also had to consider 
at least 12 more proposals from trading partners to start negotiations on free trade agreements, 
ultimately declining to pursue them. At least 24 Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreements, a pre-cursor to negotiations for a free trade agreement, have been signed. The   27
Doha Round was launched and U.S. officials have contributed to ongoing regional initiatives 
such as APEC and the FTAA. Some might argue that these activities have restored the United 
States' central role in the world trading system and that this is praise enough. However, is this 
the right metric to judge Competitive Liberalization? After all, has the implementation of this 
policy fulfilled the goals articulated for it at the beginning of the Bush Administration? This 
question is all the more important as Competitive Liberalization represents a significant break 
from the United States privileging multilateral trade initiatives. 
We argued that a number of factors have limited the effectiveness of the policy of 
Competitive Liberalization, often from the start, including: the internal divisions among U.S. 
legislators and among the executive branch over the priorities for U.S. trade policy; the 
associated tendency to load more and more conditions on U.S. trading partners before and 
during negotiations on free trade agreements; the effect of pre-existing U.S. unilateral 
preference schemes; and the options available to trading partners to bolster foreign direct 
investment other than signing free trade agreements with the United States. These constraints, 
plus concerns about the coherence of the logic underlying Competitive Liberalization and the 
incentives created by some aspects of this policy, lead us to conclude that the current U.S. 
trade policy is almost certain to fall well short of its stated goals. 
Over the longer term, U.S. officials and trade policy experts may want to reflect on the 
strength of the supposedly mutually reinforcing aspects of negotiations at the bilateral, 
regional, and multilateral levels. For if multilateralism and leading regional trade initiatives 
remain stalled, then Competitive Liberalization may amount to little more than bilateral 
opportunism masquerading as high principle with an apparently compelling narrative. 
Moreover, consideration might be given to whether the substantial number of demands made 
by U.S. trade negotiators of trading partners in FTA negotiations actually serves the best 
interests of the United States. As the number of terminated or suspended FTA negotiations to 
date in 2006 shows, there is a limited appetite for these demands abroad especially among (in 
particular larger) developing countries. Worse still, from the U.S. perspective, the substantial 
demands on American trading partners in FTA negotiations allow other countries, such as 
China and Japan, to undercut the U.S. negotiating position; leading to the potential conclusion 
that there is as much a contest between the major trading powers for foreign markets than 
there is a contest among the latter for access to the U.S. market.
51 Perhaps most importantly of 
all, at least as far as sustaining support for trade reform in the United States is concerned, to 
the extent that these demands reflect the continuing need to cater to a wide body of disparate 
U.S. domestic constituencies, then the strategy of Competitive Liberalization has not allowed 
U.S. trade negotiators to slip free of the shackles that have so constrained U.S. trade policy 
over the past 15 years.  
In summary, the numerous deficiencies and limited impact of the U.S. policy of Competitive 
Liberalization cast a different light over the relative merits of preferential and multilateral 
trade options. The weaknesses and frustrations with multilateral trade negotiations are well 
known and perhaps have been given too much weight in the deliberations of U.S. 
policymakers and corporate leaders. Now that an aggressively-pursued alternative seems 
almost certain to deliver far less than promised, and so long as free trade agreements with 
other major trading powers remain beyond the U.S. reach, looking to the future two questions 
arise. The first is whether the only serious option available to the U.S. is an exclusive 
engagement in the multilateral trade arena and the second is whether the domestic corporate 
and political factors that have done so much to undermine the current U.S. trade policy of 
                                                           
51 That  there may be an emerging contest among the major trading powers would have implications for the 
European Union too, especially since the latter is about to launch a new set of FTA negotiations in 2007.   28
Competitive Liberalization will ultimately undermine U.S. support for further multilateral 
initiatives as well.   29
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Table 1. Negotiations on Free Trade Agreements Concluded or Commenced by the Bush Administration (as of December 2006). 
Trading partner(s)  Notification to 
U.S. Congress 







Came Into Force 
Duration of 
Negotiations 
Singapore  01.10.2002  04.12.2000 16.01.2003 06.05.2003 01.01.2004 25  months 














max. 13 months 
Morocco  01.10.2002  21.01.2003 02.03.2004 15.06.2004 01.01.2006 11  months 
SACU 05.11.2002  02.06.2003  Abandoned  by 
both parties in 
April 2006.
52 
   
Australia  13.11.2002  17.03.2003 08.02.2004 18.05.2004 01.01.2005 11  months 
Bahrain  04.08.2003  26.01.2004 27.05.2004 14.09.2004 01.08.2006  4  months 
Panama 18.11.2003  26.04.2004  19.12.2006      20  months 
Colombia  18.11.2003  18.05.2004 27.02.2006 22.11.2006    22  months 
Ecuador 18.11.2003  18.05.2004  Suspended  by 
U.S.
53 
   
Peru  18.11.2003  18.05.2004 07.12.2005 12.04.2006    19  months 
Bolivia  18.11.2003  Only observing Andean FTA negotiations     
Thailand 12.02.2004  30.06.2004  Suspended
54      
UAE 15.11.2004  08.03.2005  Ongoing     
Oman  15.11.2004  12.03.2005 03.10.2005 19.01.2006    7  months 
Korea 02.02.2006  05.06.2006  Ongoing         
Malaysia 30.03.2006  12.06.2006  Ongoing         
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53 In response to the cancellation of an oil contract with U.S.-based oil company, Occidental Petroleum. See "U.S. Freezes Ecuador FTA After Government Cancels Occidental 
Contract." Inside U.S. Trade, 19 May 2006. 
54 Suspended by the Thai interim government until a new government is elected in 2007. Bangkok Post, 12 October 2006. 